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and 
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Executive Summary 
 
Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories have developed a common 
framework and key elements of a national certification methodology called 
Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU).  A spectrum from senior managers 
to weapons designers has been engaged in this activity at the two laboratories for on the 
order of a year to codify this methodology in an overarching and integrated paper.  
Following is the certification paper that has evolved.  In the process of writing this paper, 
an important outcome has been the realization that a joint Livermore/Los Alamos 
workshop on QMU, focusing on clearly identifying and quantifying differences between 
approaches between the two labs plus developing an even stronger technical foundation 
on methodology, will be valuable.  Later in FY03, such a joint laboratory workshop will 
be held.  One of the outcomes of this workshop will be a new version of this certification 
paper. 
 
 A comprehensive approach to certification must include specification of problem scope, 
development of system baseline models, formulation of standards of performance 
assessment, and effective procedures for peer review and documentation. This document 
concentrates on the assessment and peer review aspects of the problem. In addressing 
these points, a central role is played by a “watch list” for weapons derived from credible 
failure modes and performance gate analyses. The watch list must reflect our best 
assessment of factors that are critical to weapons performance.  High fidelity experiments 
and calculations as well as full exploitation of archival test data are essential to this 
process.  Peer review, advisory groups and red teams play an important role in 
confirming the validity of the watch list.  The framework for certification developed by 
the Laboratories has many basic features in common, but some significant differences in 
the detailed technical implementation of the overall methodology remain. Joint 
certification workshops held in June and December of 2001 and continued in 2002 have 
proven useful in developing the methodology, and future workshops should prove useful 
in further refining this framework.  Each laboratory developed an approach to 
certification with some differences in detailed implementation.  The general methodology 
introduces specific quantitative indicators for assessing confidence in our nuclear weapon 
stockpile.  The quantitative indicators are based upon performance margins for key 
operating characteristics and components of the system, and these are compared to 
uncertainties in these factors.  These criteria can be summarized in a quantitative metric 
(for each such characteristic) expressed as: 
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 Confidence Ratio (CR) = Margin / Uncertainty,   where CR > 1 
 
(i.e., confidence in warhead performance depends upon CR significantly exceeding unity 
for all these characteristics). 
 
These Confidence Ratios are proposed as a basis for guiding technical and programmatic 
decisions on stockpile actions. This methodology already has been deployed in certifying 
weapons undergoing current life extension programs or component remanufacture.  The 
overall approach is an adaptation of standard engineering practice and lends itself to 
rigorous, quantitative, and explicit criteria for judging the robustness of weapon system 
and component performance at a detailed level. There are, of course, a number of 
approaches for assessing these Confidence Ratios. 
 
The general certification methodology was publicly presented for the first time to a 
meeting of Strategic Command SAG in January 2002 and met with general approval.  At 
that meeting, the Laboratories committed to further refine and develop the methodology 
through the implementation process.   This paper reflects the refinement and additional 
development to date.  There will be even further refinement at a joint laboratory 
workshop later in FY03. 
 
A common certification methodology enables us to engage in peer reviews and evaluate 
nuclear weapon systems on the basis of explicit and objective metrics.  The clarity 
provided by such metrics enables each laboratory and our common customers to 
understand the meaning and logic of technical and management decisions affecting 
stockpile performance and safety.    
 
Stockpile Stewardship 
 
The United States Government (USG) entered a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992 
and since then has been maintaining its current nuclear weapon stockpile without nuclear 
testing.  Additionally, the USG has not yet required that any weapons of fundamentally 
new design be developed for the stockpile.  These decisions changed the nature of the 
weapons program from a program that designs, tests and deploys weapons to a program 
that determines, to a high degree of confidence, when an existing or refurbished weapon 
design will   continue to perform as intended.  For most of the history of the US nuclear 
weapons program, nuclear testing was a critical component for stockpile weapon 
certification.  The codes used in the design and certification process employed models 
that, in many cases, were incomplete or inaccurate representations of relevant physical 
processes.  The quantity and quality of calculations that could be run were also 
constrained by computing hardware limitations.  As a result, computational models often 
employed ad-hoc multipliers to match data from Above Ground Experiments (AGEX) or 
nuclear tests.  These computational models worked best for limited interpolation between 
nuclear tests.  However, throughout the nuclear testing era, computational capability, 
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AGEX facilities, and our ability to diagnose both nuclear and non-nuclear experiments 
continued to evolve. 
 
We find ourselves in a different world today.  For more than half a decade, we have been 
developing the tools required to conduct stockpile stewardship in the post nuclear test era.  
We are developing and applying enhanced predictive capabilities that incorporate 
improved theoretical, computational and experimental capabilities needed for 
certification without conducting nuclear tests.  Advances in AGEX technology are 
making possible more precise measurements of some of the detailed physics that occurs 
during the operation of a nuclear weapon.   Improved physics models plus the enormous 
increases in supercomputer speed and capacity brought about by the Accelerated 
Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) enable the use of very high resolution (both 
spatially and temporally), high-fidelity code calculations.  Such calculations will enable 
us to reduce our reliance on ad-hoc normalization factors.  The ASCI codes, validated 
against AGEX and archival nuclear test data, have strong potential to improve our 
confidence in extrapolation (in addition to interpolation) from past nuclear test results.  
The application of these new stewardship tools to Stockpile Life Extension Programs 
(SLEPs) and other stockpile issues requires a certification methodology that is 
quantitative, rigorous and transparent to external review. 
 
Rigorous Certification Standards 
 
Certification is the process, culminating in a formal declaration by the Laboratory 
Directors, that establishes that nuclear weapons meet Military Characteristics (MCs) and 
Stockpile-to-Target-Sequence (STS) requirements.  The certification methodology must 
include a rigorous set of quantitative standards.  These quantitative standards must ensure 
that, when met, there are adequate margins against credible failure modes, or 
equivalently, that design parameters remain within their performance gates.   Some 
degradation in expected performance of stockpiled weapons, either from recently 
recognized original design or manufacturing flaws (“birth defects”) or changes arising 
from aging (observed, e.g., through surveillance) or remanufacture, can be anticipated.  
Certification may be viewed as a process wherein design parameters, performance gates, 
uncertainties, and margins are evaluated against one another to determine whether the 
functional requirements of the nuclear warhead have been satisfied.  Certification thus 
becomes a positive action based on quantitative evaluations of weapons performance as 
measured against explicit standards. 
 
In a “Performance Gate” analysis (LANL), we view a nuclear weapon as a physical 
system whose time evolution defines a performance or functional requirement timeline.  
The system evolution is punctuated by a number of critical points that represent key 
events and separate the timeline into a number of natural stages of operation (see Figure 
1).  Performance gates are assigned to physical variables characterizing device behavior 
at each critical design point.  The lower and upper boundaries of the performance gates 
represent the range of variation in the physical variables for which an expert can supply 
convincing evidence that device performance will, with high confidence, meet MCs and 
STS requirements.  Within the performance gates, a design point typically assumes a 
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range of values (the designed operating range), and this entire range is ideally located a 
safe distance from the gate boundaries to ensure that the device operates properly (see 
Figure 2). The gates may be evaluated in terms of confidence factors or in terms of 
probability that the device metrics fall within acceptable limits. Typically gates will be 
evaluated in the context of potential failure mechanisms and with regard to possible 
changes from tested configurations. 
 
             
 
Figure 1:  Critical points during system evolution 
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Figure 2:  An illustration of a design point within a performance gate and how the 
Confidence Ratio is defined. 
 
  
In dealing with potential failure modes for current weapons (LLNL), we must address a 
broad range of issues.  Typical issues include: engineering features introduced during life 
extension programs, performance in extreme STS environments, performance under aged 
conditions, marginal performance, degradation of key materials, surveillance replacement 
pits, high explosive (HE) degradation and cracking, detonator deterioration, detonator 
redesign, metal corrosion, and proposed changes to manufacturing processes.  How then 
can we have confidence that we have systematically addressed the credible failure modes 
for device and engineering issues?  To do this, we assemble a group of experts who 
identify critical stages in device evolution, establish metrics to ensure proper 
performance, and identify a list of credible failure modes and performance issues for the 
current stockpile.  This group then works down the functional operation “tree” for a 
nuclear weapon to develop a watch list of items that constitutes the observables of 
credible failure modes (see Figure 3).  In general, this must be an on-going process. 
 
Having developed the watch list, margins and associated uncertainties must then be 
quantified for all of the items.  The quantitative results of this process enable the 
responsible individuals to prioritize the watch list and thereby make rational decisions 
about the allocations of program resources to stockpile needs.  Key to this certification 
strategy is that margin must always significantly exceed uncertainty for all critical issues.  
We therefore establish our standard for changes to be a Confidence Ratio (CR) defined as 
the ratio of the margin to the sum of salient uncertainties, where CR > 1.  Figure 4 shows 
an example of the performance gate approach as applied to system components. 
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This should be a continuous processi  l    ti  rTh s shou d be a con nuous p ocess
A group of experts identified a list of credible failure 
modes and issues for the current stockpile
 
 
Figure 3:  Weapon function “tree” used to identify watch list items. 
 
In both “Performance Gate” and “Failure Mode” analyses, margins against known failure 
modes give us the tools to manage system risks in light of uncertainties in our knowledge.  
Confidence Ratios can be used to determine the relative ranking of risks and set program 
priorities.  They can also be used to determine when research efforts have reached their 
goals.  In this way, confidence factors (or ratios) can bring transparency and closure to 
program elements. 
 
Our approach defines the strategy for certification and for the stockpile stewardship 
program.  Certification must be based on rigorous, quantitative standards for each stage 
of device function and for all credible failure modes.  Maintaining design parameters 
within their gates and margins with Confidence Ratio >1 for each credible failure mode is 
necessary for proper performance throughout device evolution.    The ultimate limit (and 
goal) of this certification methodology is to confidently quantify the range of credible 
yields of any aged or rebuilt primary or secondary and the minimum required drive for 
any aged or rebuilt secondary to within the uncertainty limits established by nuclear test 
experience.  Thus, the certification methodology, leads to specific goals.  It provides 
closure. 
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Figure 4: Margin is the excess performance beyond the minimum need to successfully 
function and the minimum performance allowed under normal operation.  The 
uncertainties are associated with our incomplete knowledge of the limits of margin. The 
Confidence Ratio (CR) then becomes CR= margin /Σ uncertainty and CR > 1 is always 
required to maintain confidence. 
 
Experience with System Application 
 
QMU either has been, or is being, applied to several weapon systems in the stockpile.  
During the certification process for a recent warhead refurbishment program, a diverse 
team of weapon experts assembled to develop a failure modes “watch list.”  Confidence 
ratios were proposed for all critical elements.  The refurbishment team (not the team who 
developed the watch list) paid particular attention to nuclear performance over the full 
range of stockpile-to-target-sequence environments.  Our experience with QMU in this 
refurbishment has led us to apply the approach to a current engineering development 
program for the refurbishment of a second warhead type. Performance gates are being 
used in major SLEPs to help prioritize expensive experiments.  For example, a decision 
for a recent major AGEX experiment was based on the relevance of the performance gate 
it addressed and a quantitative assessment of the potential increase in confidence through 
anticipated reduction in uncertainty. 
 
In these system applications, how can we ensure that all credible failure modes and/or 
performance gates have been considered?  Clearly, known issues must be addressed up 
front.  It is easiest to deal with what one knows about.  Further, we must continue efforts 
to address past nuclear test surprises in order to convert these surprises to known issues.  
The most daunting issues, however, are those that one suspects exist but does not yet 
know about, the unknown unknowns.  Open and critical evaluation is essential to 
  10
covering all salient issues.  Peer review is essential.  External advisory panels can 
contribute a distinct perspective.  Finally, “red teams” can increase the level of 
confidence in the QMU procedure.  A “red team” is an entirely separate team empowered 
to examine and question all aspects of the design team’s work.  They can initiate and do 
their own work (unlike a peer review team) and can pursue alternate paths.   Taking 
multiple approaches to the review process will help us to achieve an understanding of 
failure modes and their remediation that is as complete as possible in the absence of 
further nuclear tests. 
 
Conclusions and Path Forward 
 
The stockpile refurbishment schedule for this new decade is demanding and will require 
many complex capabilities.  Complicating this demanding schedule is the fact that history 
indicates that we should expect a major stockpile “surprise” every few years.  We must 
be aware that this schedule, combined with finite resources, has delayed development of 
required certification capabilities relative to the pace of stockpile needs.  This 
underscores the need for a methodology that allows margins to be managed against 
uncertainties in order to understand the state of the stockpile and so rationally make 
priority decisions.  We believe that the certification methodology outlined here is a 
substantial step toward meeting this need. 
 
We plan, through a series of both local and joint workshops, to continue to expand and 
refine our certification methodology, and we foresee periodic updates in the formal 
documentation of the details of QMU implementation.  
